By PIO S. VERZOLA JR.

The project

In late 1972, following the declaration of martial law on Sept. 21, a then barely-known logging company began to make its presence felt in Abra province, conducting spot tree surveys in the forested eastern uplands. The company was owned by Herminio T. Disini, a crony of then-President Ferdinand Marcos.

THE CELLOPHIL RESORCES CORPORATION. Photo courtesy of Cordillera Resource Center

The Cellophil Resources Corporation (CRC), officially formed in May 1973, was quickly awarded by the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) just four months later with a Timber and Pulpwood License Agreement (TPLA), which covered some 99,565 hectares of pine forests in Abra and Kalinga-Apayao.

Next, the Cellulose Processing Corporation (CPC), a sister company of CRC, was formed in January 1974, and also quickly awarded two months later with a TPLA for 99,230 hectares of forest land in areas adjacent to the CRC concessions.

DELIVERING THE GOODS. Photo courtesy of Cordillera Resource Center

Thus, in just one year, Cellophil (both CRC and CPC) had quietly obtained almost 200,000 hectares of mostly pine forests in Abra, Kalinga-Apayao, Mountain Province, Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur, covering some of the most extensive watersheds of Northern Luzon, and affecting an estimated 145,000 inhabitants of the area (mostly indigenous peoples).

The forest concessions were to provide the wood to a long-fiber kraft pulp mill to be built at Gaddani in Tayum, Abra. The mill was to produce the basic material for cellophane, with an initial capacity of 70,000 metric tons yearly. Around 62% of the output were to be exported to Japan and Europe, and the rest to be processed by local plants.

Photo courtesy of Cordillera Resource Center

In May 1974, Cellophil obtained a loan from a a consortium of European financial institutions to cover up to 80% of the project cost of P1.357 billion. The Development Bank of the Philippines stood as loan guarantor.

In 1975, Cellophil made plans to develop a 50,000-hectare pine plantation in the foothills between its Gaddani mill and its forest concessions further upstream, to supplement the pulp mill’s wood supply. Later, it was decided that the government’s Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) would operate the plantation with World Bank support.

The initial struggle

Throughout the period 1973-1976, the Cellophil project began to be quietly implemented on the ground without much fanfare. Peasant lands in Gaddani, Tayum town (60 hectares) and in Mudiit, Dolores town (55 hectares) were forcibly acquired to give way to the pulp mill and the pine plantation nursery, respectively. There was some organized resistance by the lowland peasants who were part-Ilocano and part-Tingguian, with the support of advocacy groups, but these were not enough to prevent the implementation of the project.

In December 1976 and February 1977, Cellophil officials had to open up to seminar-type “dialogues” with Tingguian leaders in Tineg, Tubo and elsewhere, as a belated response to the clamor of indigenous communities for all sides to be heard. The communities demanded that Cellophil respect their ancestral land rights and traditional resource usage.

The initial seminars settled nothing, but served to alert the Tingguians about the dangers of the Cellophil project and the intransigence of the company. The communities began to gear themselves for a determined mass struggle. Apart from the elders’ councils and the local governments, women and youth began to form their own local organizations and also sought the help of the Catholic Church, including the parish priests of the Society of the Divine Word (SVD) who worked among them.

On March 4, 1977, community representatives of Tubo town met at barangay Tiempo and signed Resolution 6-A, expressing in writing for the first time, that they opposed to the Cellophil project because it would erode their cultural rights and violate local peace pacts.

RESISTANCE. A lakay emphasizes the need to stop the logging operation of CRC as it destroys the livilihood of the Tingguians and the environment. Photo courtesy of Cordillera Resource Center

The Tingguians asked the SVD parish priests – some of whom were themselves Tingguian – to support their demand to suspend the Cellophil project. In response, Cellophil accused the said priests as “subversives” and “anti-government”. In a meeting of the provincial Church-Military Liaison Committee (CMLC), the Church formally denied the company’s accusations.

Cellophil and government escalates campaign

Amid mounting local opposition to the project, Cellophil launched a comprehensive public-relations campaign starting in May 1977. It formed a Community Relations Office (CRO), which conducted local dialogues, published a monthly newsletter (Rangtay), aired a radio program over DZPA (Abra’s only radio station), and organized local cultural activities – in a bid to prove that it respected public opinion and indigenous customs.

Behind this facade, however, the Marcos dictatorship quickly moved to intervene in behalf of Cellophil. In March 1977, the mayor of Tineg (a Tingguian municipality and Cellophil’s planned first site for its logging operations) was suddenly replaced by Captain Alfredo Cuyupan of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). The military mayor quickly moved to suppress anti-Cellophil opposition within Tineg.

In June 1977, the first Tri-Sectoral Meeting was held by government, military, Church, and Cellophil officials – with no Tingguian leader present because they were not invited. Meanwhile, Abra PC provincial commander, Col. Constancio Lasaten, started to campaign actively for Cellophil during dialogues with communities.

In September 1977, the governor himself was replaced by Arturo Barbero, the son of then Defense Undersecretary Carmelo Barbero, a staunch Marcos ally and long-standing Abra warlord. The young Barbero openly declared his support for Cellophil, and practically committed the provincial PC to provide military backing for the project.

The struggle expands to other areas

Next, Cellophil turned its attention to Malibcong town. The entire Bangilo district forged a resolution in December 1977, raising a comprehensive set of demands for Cellophil’s action, basically asking that the project respect all existing ancestral land rights and customary laws, including peace-pact provisions.

RESISTANCE. Community meetings, petition signing and “linking arms” where done to unite the people against large-scale logging operations of CRC. Photo courtesy of Cordillera Resource Center

In June 1978, Cellophil and BFD officials responded with a series of meetings, where they effectively rejected the Bangilo people’s demands.

In turn, the Bangilo people together with their SVD Church allies called on other affected Abra tribes to join them in an inter-tribal peace pact meeting on September 24-25, 1978. Peace pact holders and other elders from the other Tingguian tribes in Malibcong, Bucloc and Tubo, urban-based rights advocacy groups, as well as Cellophil and government representatives, attended the meeting.

RESISTANCE. Community meetings, petition signing and “linking arms” where done to unite the people against large-scale logging operations of CRC. Photo courtesy of Cordillera Resource Center

The meeting was a crucial turning point because it clearly drew the lines of struggle: the Cellophil with its hardline stance, together with the one-sided support of the provincial government, the local PC, and the BFD, on one hand; and the growing unity of the indigenous communities and their allies among Church and advocacy groups, on the other hand.

The broad anti-Cellophil opposition formulated a joint resolution that, for the first time, clearly framed their demands in the long-term context of indigenous peoples’ rights and grassroots democracy. This Bangilo resolution was quickly followed by other anti-Cellophil declarations from other indigenous communities in Abra and neighboring provinces.

The Cellophil camp attempted to counter this increasingly militant opposition by meeting with local officials of Malibcong and Tubo and playing carrot-and-stick games with them. The local PC started to harass and monitor the local Catholic clergy and lay workers, singled out a few SVD priests (including then Fr. Conrado Balweg) as “instigators,” and required permits even for normal religious services.

The broad anti-Cellophil ranks were not cowed. Instead, they continued to expand the arena of struggle. On November 22, 1978, Tubo peace-pact holders met and agreed to host a much-wider inter-provincial bodong (peace pact summit) for a joint response to the Cellophil threat, scheduled for January 25-26, 1979.

In near-panic, Cellophil and government officials led by Governor Barbero tried to preempt the multilateral bodong by calling for a meeting with municipal officials a few days earlier and badgering them to sign a pro-Cellophil “Mutual Agreement.”

RESISTANCE. Community meetings, petition signing and “linking arms” where done to unite the people against large-scale logging operations of CRC. Photo courtesy of Cordillera Resource Center

This, however, failed to drive a wedge among the communities and their local leaders. The inter-provincial bodong went on as scheduled in barangay Tiempo, with representatives from 21 communities and urban support groups, and with national media coverage. On the last day, the delegates signed a unanimous resolution that demanded the immediate cancellation of Cellophil’s two TPLA’s, and drew up a seven-point “Pagta ti Kalon” that bound all signatories to use their peace-pact mechanisms in opposing the project.

Cellophil camp turns outright fascist, anti-Cellophil opposition joins armed Left

Starting in February 1979, Cellophil and the various instrumentalities of the Marcos dictatorship went all out in their efforts to suppress the growing people’s movement against the Cellophil project. They tried to discredit the Tiempo bodong and resolution. On March 20, 1979, the civilian mayor of Malibcong was replaced by PC Major Cuyupan, the military mayor of Tineg. The PC town detachment was reinforced, and local anti-Cellophil activities were repressed. On March 30, new mayors for five upland towns were sworn into office, in a clear attempt by Barbero to consolidate his control over the rebellious Tingguian communities.

At the same time, Abra’s civilian and military officials forced a number of Tingguian leaders to attend a “seminar” in Bangued and sign another pro-Cellophil declaration. Following this spurious “Bangued declaration,” Cellophil tried to further picture itself as a benevolent civic organization that helped advance Tingguian interests.

By mid-1979, Cellophil began its actual logging operations in earnest. Faced with stubborn community-level resistance in all areas, the government increasingly relied on the formation of military detachments in key choke-points, arrested and detained local leaders and activists, and imposed night curfews to control people’s movement.

RESISTANCE. Community meetings, petition signing and “linking arms” where done to unite the people against large-scale logging operations of CRC. Photo courtesy of Cordillera Resource Center

Frustrated by a super-deceptive Cellophil and harsh iron-hand tactics by the government, the people and the broad anti-Cellophil movement on the other hand resorted increasingly to militant mass struggles and more radical politics at the ground level.

By 1979, too, grassroots community organizers of the National Democratic Front (many of whom were indigenous to the Cordillera or natives of Abra) claimed a mass base strong enough to support the reentry of small units of the New People’s Army.

In August 1979, the military demanded the surrender of several SVD priests working among Abra communities, whom they tagged as communist sympathizers. Four of the priests promptly went underground and joined the armed struggle. They included then Fr. Conrado Balweg (who later turned renegade and led the CPLA back to the government fold) and Fr. Nilo Valerio (who was later killed by government troopers in Bakun, Benguet).

With the able support of the NPA, the indigenous communities successfully utilized a wide range of legal and extra-legal tactics to foil Cellophil’s step-by-step plans to implement its project. These included blocking company vehicles, destroying company equipment, as well as attacking the military escorts of company sorties into the uplands.

The period 1980-1986 saw the comprehensive development in Abra, from its initial anti-Cellophil orientation, of a much wider people’s resistance against imperialism, fascism, and national oppression against indigenous peoples. This people’s movement converged with similar streams of mass struggle in other parts of the Cordillera, and ultimately nationwide, until the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship finally collapsed. In the process, the Cellophil project was finally abandoned.

These brilliant concluding chapters of the Cordillera people’s struggles against Cellophil have yet to be more fully documented and written down. But one thing remains clear: Through determined mass struggle and unity with the rest of the Filipino people, the Tingguian peoples had successfully shown their capacity to defend their ancestral lands and other rights, and to contribute to the wider movement to fight for national freedom, genuine democracy, and self-determination for indigenous peoples. #

Note: This article was also submitted for Hapit, the official newsletter of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), for its April 2008 issue. In writing this article, the author is greatly indebted to the CPA for providing source materials, including two papers, “The Dialectic of Development: Tribal Responses to Development Capital in the Cordillera Central, Northern Luzon, Philippines” by Richard F. Dorrall, 1990, and “The Tingguians of Abra and Cellophil: A Situation Report” submitted to the 2nd National Conference of the UGAT (Anthropological Association of the Philippines), 1979.